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  Using an unbalanced panel of accounting data from 1997 to 2004 and control-
ling for individual bank costs and risk, we find capital buffers of the banks in the in 
the EU15 have a significant negative co-movement with the cycle. For banks in the 
accession countries there is significant positive co-movement. Capital buffers of 
commercial and savings banks, and of large banks, exhibit negative co-movement. 
Those of co-operative and smaller banks exhibit positive co-movement. Speeds of 
adjustment are fairly slow.  We interpret these results and discuss policy implica-
tions, noting that negative co-movement of capital buffers will exacerbate the pro-
cyclical impact of Basel II.  
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Much debate surrounding the new Accord (Basel II) on bank capital requirements, 
due to come into force in 2007, has centred on its potential ‘pro-cyclicality’. One of 
the primary aims of Basel II is to create a closer link between capital requirements 
and risks, so it is clear that these requirements will become more dependent on the 
business cycle. In a cyclical downturn, when counterparties are more likely to be 
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downgraded than upgraded, the resultant effect could be a significant increase in the 
capital requirements to account for increased counterparty risk. Similarly, during an 
economic upturn, the amount of capital required would be reduced. Since raising 
capital is costly, especially during an economic recession when profits are decreas-
ing, banks might be forced to reduce their loan portfolio in a recession, so as to meet 
rising capital requirements. Thus many have argued that the new Accord will make 
it much harder for policy makers to maintain macroeconomic stability.  
  The growing literature on the potential pro-cyclicality of Basel II has largely fo-
cussed on quantifying the likely range of variation in ‘Pillar 1’ capital requirements 
through the business cycle.
1 In practice, well-functioning banks hold capital well in 
excess of the minimum requirements, which will reduce the impact of Pillar 1 regu-
latory capital requirements on loan portfolios. Moreover, the supervisory review 
powers granted to regulators under Pillar 2, allowing them to demand a buffer of ad-
ditional capital during a business cycle expansion, provide policy makers with a tool 
to counter the potential pro-cyclicality effect of the new accord. All this implies that 
the management of bank capital buffers over the course of the business cycle will be 
as important, or even more important, than the ‘Pillar 1’ requirements as a determi-
nant of the cyclical impact of the new accord.  
  With this policy concern in mind, we investigate the cyclical behaviour of bank 
capital buffers of European banks, under the old Basel 1988 accord on capital regu-
lation. By ‘capital buffer’ we mean the amount of capital banks hold in excess of 
that required of them by national regulators. The main objective of our paper is to 
establish the extent of co-movement between this buffer and the cycle, and to deter-
mine whether such co-movement is country, bank type or bank size specific. We 
also analyse the impact of various cost and revenue variables on the behaviour of 
bank capital buffers.  
  Our estimation results reveal substantial differences in the cyclical behaviour of 
capital buffers. We find that capital buffers of RAM (10 countries that joined the EU 
in May 2004) banks move together with the business cycle while those of banks in 
the Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom (DK-SE-UK) and EA sub-samples 
exhibit negative co-movement.
2 We also find additional distinctions by size and type 
of bank.. Capital buffers of commercial and savings banks, as well as those of larger 
banks have a negative relationship with the cycle while those of co-operative banks 
and of smaller banks move together with the cycle. In almost all cases we find a 
fairly slow speed of adjustment towards desired capital buffers. These results pro-
                                                 
1 Basel II is based on three complementary pillars. Pillar 1 consists of the regulatory calculations of 
capital requirements for market, credit, and operational risk. Pillar 2 is the supervisory review proc-
ess, where supervisors assess both the bank’s total capital adequacy for the full range of risks includ-
ing those not covered by Pillar 1 and the bank’s management of capital. Pillar 3 is market discipline. 
In order to improve transparency of banks to counterparties and investors, banks will be required to 
disclose detailed information on their risk profile and capital adequacy. 
2 The latter finding is broadly in line with most of the individual country studies that analyse the de-
terminants of excess capital and their relationship to the cycle (see among others Ediz et al., 1998; 
Rime, 2001; Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindqvist, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 2005).   2
vide a benchmark from which inferences relating to the introduction of Basel II and 
its effect on capital buffer management can be made. In particular, they shed some 
light on how capital management decision may need to be adjusted through Pillar II 
and III of Basel II in order to offset the potential cyclical effects of the new accord. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation for hold-
ing excess capital, sets out the hypotheses we test, and describes our data including 
the various controls we introduce for bank specific determinants of bank capital. 
Section 3 presents our specification and empirical results and summarises some ro-
bustness checks. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. Hypotheses and Data Description 
Our data, for the years 1997-2004, indicates that banks hold far more prudential 
capital than that required by the regulators (see Table 1).
3 Total capital buffers (tier 
1 plus tier 2) of banks within the EU15 vary from 1.87 percent of risk-weighted as-
sets in Portugal to 4.79 percent in Finland with an average across the EU15 of 2.93 
percent. Buffers are also substantial in the accession countries, ranging between 2.64 
percent in Cyprus and 6.99 in Malta. The average buffer for the RAM10 is around 
5.14 percent which is considerably larger than in the EU15. 
  Several reasons have been put forward to explain why banks hold excess capital 
(see amongst other studies Marcus, 1984; Berger et al., 1995; Jackson et. al., 1999; 
Milne and Whalley, 2001; Estrella, 2004; Milne, 2004). Banks generally will tend to 
assess their risks differently than regulators, for instance using their own internal 
economic capital models. Appropriate bank-specific capital levels will therefore be 
set according to their own assumptions and risk appetites. Banks may also need to 
hold excess capital in order to signal soundness to the market and satisfy the expec-
tations of rating agencies (Jackson et. al., 1999). These ‘market disciplines’ may 
lead banks to holding more capital required by regulators. 
  Banks may also hold a buffer of capital as a protection against the violation of 
the regulatory minimum requirements (Marcus, 1984; Milne and Whalley, 2001; 
Milne, 2004). By holding capital as a buffer, banks insure themselves against costs 
arising from a supervisory intervention in response to a violation of the require-
ments.  
  A further reason for holding a capital buffer is to take advantage of future 
'growth opportunities', putting banks in a position to obtain wholesale funds quickly 
and at a competitive rate of interest in the event of unexpected profitable investment 
opportunities. In the event of a substantial increase in loan demand, banks with rela-
tively little capital may lose market share to those that are well capitalised. 
                                                 
3 Similarly large capital buffers are also held by US and Asian banks. See for example Peura and 
Jokivuolle (2004) for a tabulation of US capital buffers.   3
  It is difficult to empirically distinguish these different underlying determinants 
of bank capital buffers: for example higher portfolio volatility can be expected to 
increase capital buffers, whether these are the result of market disciplines or of a de-
sire to avoid supervisory interventions. Our paper has a more limited objective, to 
investigate how capital buffers of European banks behave over the business cycle, 
and in particular whether capital buffers are higher in business upturns and lower in 
business downturns (positive co-movement) or the reverse (negative co-movement), 
controlling as far as we can for various bank specific determinants of capital buff-
ers..  
  We thus test the following null hypothesis:  0 H  Under the Basel I Accord, 
business cycle fluctuations do not have an impact on the capital buffers of Euro-
pean banks; against two alternatives: ) ( 1 a H  Capital buffers co-move positively with 
the business cycle i.e. banks tend to increase capital in business cycle expansions 
and reduce capital in recessions; and  ) ( 1 b H  Capital buffers co-move negatively 
with the business cycle i.e. banks tend to reduce capital in business cycle expan-
sions and increase capital in recessions.  
  These descriptive hypotheses are consistent with a number of different underly-
ing structural models of bank capital dynamics. Estrella (2004) examines the rela-
tionship between optimal forward looking capital buffers and deterministic cycles of 
loan losses. He finds that banks, subject to costs of capital adjustment, will build up 
capital buffers in anticipation of loan losses. Since loan losses themselves tend to lag 
the business cycle, this suggests that actual capital buffers will rise during cyclical 
downturns, i.e. negative cyclical co-movement. 
  It is also argued (see amongst others Rajan, 1994; Borio et al., 2001; Crockett, 
2001) that portfolio risks actually increase during an economic upturn. During an 
economic boom, lenders provide large amounts of credit while imbalances that will 
become responsible for the following recession continue to build up, increasing the 
possibility of unusually large losses during a cyclical downturn. Under this interpre-
tation rational forward looking banks may build up capital buffers during cyclical 
upturns, i.e. positive co-movement.  
  Both positive and negative co-movement may also arise as a consequence of 
myopic bank behaviour. For example during an economic upturn, when risks are 
less likely to immediately materialise,  banks may underestimate risks and as a result 
expand their loan portfolios and lower their capital ratios (negative co-movement). 
On the other hand unanticipatedly high levels of loan-loss provisions in an extended 
cyclical downturn may lead to lower capital ratios in a deep recession (positive co-
movement) 
  While we cannot distinguish these different structural models of bank capital 
buffers, or distinguish myopic from forward looking expectations, we can control for 
institution specific factors that influence the banks desired level of capital. A large 
body of literature examines variations in risk profile and portfolio and capital struc-
ture decisions between different types of banks (see among others, Saunders et al., 
1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Esty, 1997; Salas and Saurina, 2002b). Differences   4
in capital buffers can arise because of variations, in portfolio risks, in ownership 
structures and in access to the capital market.  
  The clearest prediction of this literature is that larger banks will hold smaller 
average capital buffers. Most obviously, large geographically diversified banks will 
have a much smaller probability of experiencing a large decline in their capital ra-
tios, a diversification effect increasing with size. This effect is reinforced by asym-
metric information between lenders and borrowers and by government support for 
banks that are ‘too big to fail’. Banks help overcome information asymmetries by 
screening and monitoring borrowers, but these are costly activities and banks are 
likely to balance the cost of (and gain from) these activities against the cost of ex-
cess capital. To the extent that large banks enjoy economies of scale in screening 
and monitoring they will require less capital relative to the size of their loan assets. 
Large banks may also expect a greater degree of support than small banks from the 
government in the event of difficulties, further reducing capital buffers.  
 
Sample selection 
We build an unbalanced panel data set with eight years of annual bank balance sheet 
data obtained from the Bureau Van Dyck Bankscope database. Our sample includes 
data for commercial, savings and co-operative banks. In total, 468 banks are in-
cluded in the sample, made up of 364 EA banks, 427 EU15 banks and 41 banks for 
the RAM10 (the 10 accession countries that joined the European Union in 2005). All 
25 European Union countries are represented in the sample. As is usual in panel 
studies using accounting data, we remove some extreme outlier observations of 
changes in capital buffers.
4 
  We have to consider carefully the timing of accounting years. The majority of 
bank accounting years end in the December of the calendar year (this applies to 
around 80 percent of our observations. However some 20 percent of our observa-
tions are for accounting years ending between January and March. Since capital 
buffers in the first quarter of the calendar year are determined by economic condi-
tions in the previous year, we have transferred all accounting years ending between 
January and March back one year, so for example an end-March 2004 year we clas-
sify as an 2003 observation.) 
  The largest bank in the samples is BNP Paribas, with total assets of around €906 
bln at the end of 2004. The smallest bank, Budapest Bank in Hungary, has total as-
sets amounting to just around €1.5 million at the end of 2004. The largest number of 
banks are in France (103 banks) and Spain (70 banks) from the EU15 and in Poland 
(10 banks) for the RAM10.  
                                                 
4 Data errors lead to occasional very large movements in reported capital buffers. Of the total 3736 
observations available to us, we dropped 21 in the extreme tails of the cross sectional distribution of 
capital buffers, with a much larger number of standard deviations from the mean than the bulk of ob-
servations, on the assumption that these are reporting errors.   5
  Our sample is further broken down by bank type distinguishing between com-
mercial, co-operative and savings banks. We additionally differentiate between 
'small' and 'large' banks, defining large banks as those with total assets exceeding the 
2004 median of €37 billion in 2004. The sample distribution across sub-samples, by 
type and size of bank, is presented in Table 3. The RAM10 sub-sample is made up 
of small commercial banks, with the exception of a small Polish savings bank, 
Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank. We divide the EU15 into two further sub-
samples, the Euro area (EA) and Denmark, Sweden, and UK (DK-SE-UK). The two 
sub-samples and the total EU15 contain a similar breakdown of banks, with 19 per-
cent of banks large and with 65 percent commercial banks, 15 percent co-operative 
banks and around 20 percent savings banks. Across the entire data set Sweden has 
the largest percentage of 'large' banks (around 50 percent), followed by Ireland 
(around 35 percent).  
 
Dependent and explanatory variables 
Table 1 tabulates average capital buffers in our sample, by time and by country. 
Here the capital buffer is measured as the institutions’ total Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital 
Basel 1 risk-weighted capital ratio less its regulatory minimum requirements.
5 These 
requirements vary slightly from one country to another, as summarised in Table 2, 
sometimes exceeding the Basel minimum of 8 percent. The individual country aver-
ages are averages weighted by the market share (total assets) of the individual banks. 
There are several differences in the buffer sizes between countries. Many of the 
smaller countries such as Finland, Belgium and Ireland have large buffers of around 
4 percent when compared to banks in larger countries such as France and Italy and 
the UK, where the buffers are around two percent above the required minimum.  
  On average over our sample period RAM10 banks held far more capital than 
banks in the EU15 countries (see the averages of the composite countries at the bot-
tom of Table 1). However this gap has declined over time. Figure 1 plots the evolu-
tion of our individual sub-sample capital buffers. In the EU15 capital buffers rose 
slightly between 1998 and 1999, but then increased substantially between 2002 and 
2003. In the RAM10 countries capital buffers have behaved very differently, rising 
steadily from 1997 to 1998 before falling sharply between 2000 and 2001. Thereaf-
ter, the RAM10 buffer level continues on a slight downward trend and by 2004 is at 
a similar level to the EU15.  
  Figure 1 also distinguishes between different bank types and bank sizes, for the 
EU25 and for our three sub-samples (EA, DK-SE-UK and RAM10), and compares 
these buffers with our principal explanatory variable, the output gap. The capital 
                                                 
5 We study only the total capital buffer not the Tier 1 buffer. There are two reasons for this. We need 
to take account of variations in the minimum level of required capital between jurisdictions (Table 2). 
As summarized in Table2 these differences are in total not Tier 1 capital requirements. Also the main 
source of capital fluctuation e.g. equity and loan loss reserves, affect both Tier 1 and total capital 
buffers.   6
buffers of co-operative banks behave very differently than those of commercial and 
savings banks, possibly reflecting the differences in ownership structure and objec-
tives of co-operative banks.
6 This figure also confirms that small banks hold much 
higher average capital buffers than large banks.  
  Table 4 provides definitions of the variables used in our estimation. Our cyclical 
indicator is real GDP growth calculated from Eurostat data for each of the 25 coun-
tries and for the different sub-sample country groupings.
7 Our basic specification 
(model 1) includes three additional variables (ROE ,RISK  andSIZE ) as controls for 
various determinants of individual capital buffers as discussed by (Estrella, 2004). 
The first of these determinants is the greater cost of equity capital funding, relative 
to deposits or debt. Theoretical analysis (see Myers and Majluf, 1984; Campbell, 
1979) suggests that in the context of information asymmetries, equity is a more 
costly alternative to other bank liabilities. Equity may also be disadvantaged because 
interest payments on debt are deducted from earnings before tax.  
  Direct measurement of this cost is difficult. Previous studies (see among others 
Ayuso et al. 2004; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 2005) have 
included the banks return on equity ) (ROE , the ratio of post-tax earnings to book 
equity, as a proxy for the direct costs of remunerating excess capital. However ROE  
may well exceed the remuneration demanded by shareholders and to this extent is a 
measure of revenue rather than cost. For comparability with previous studies we in-
clude  ROE as a control variable, but we acknowledge that this reflects both revenue 
and cost. The buffer capital model of Milne (2004) suggests that for financially 
strong banks the revenue impact will generate a negative relationship between ROE  
and capital buffers, because a high level of earnings substitutes for capital as a buffer 
against unexpected shocks i.e. under both cost and revenue interpretations we expect 
to observe a negative relationship between the capital buffer and the ROE variable. 
  The second determinant identified by Estrella is the expected cost of failure 
equal to the deadweight cost carried by shareholders times the probability of fail-
ure.
8 Since a bank’s probability of failure is dependent on its risk profile, we proxy 
the cost of failure by adopting various measures of risk. As a first measure, we con-
sider the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans  ) (RISK  as in Ayuso et. al 
(2004). This is an ex post measure of the risks assumed by banks and is comparable 
to other measures adopted in the literature since banks with non-performing loans 
are obliged to make provisions for loan losses. If banks set their capital in line with 
the true riskiness of their portfolios, then we would expect the relationship here to be 
                                                 
6 Co-operative banks cannot easily issue new shares and members prefer cash payments over retained 
earnings because there is no market for their ownership claims. 
7 We also investigated the use of the output gap which we obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter to the real GDP series. Estimates substituting this gap differed to only a minor extent and are 
therefore not presented here. 
8 An alternative framework for modelling these costs is Milne, 2004 and Milne and Whalley, 2001.   7
positive.
9 As discussed above there are several reasons, most notably greater portfo-
lio diversification, for expecting a negative relationship between bank size and the 
level of capital buffers. Furthermore, we include dummy variables denoted BIG and 
SMALLto capture differences in buffer movements varying with the size of the in-
stitution.  BIG  equals one for banks in the highest decile of the size distribution of 
assets and otherwise equals zero.  Similarly SMALL equals one for banks in the 
lowest thirty percentile of the size distribution of assets. These dummy variables are 
recomputed for each time period and for each sub-sample. 
  In a further specification (model 2) we include three additional balance sheet 
variables to control for the determinants of bank capital. Our PROFIT variable cap-
turing post tax profits over total assets has an ambiguous anticipated sign. Higher 
retained earnings can be expected to increase capital buffers, but also higher ex-
pected earnings can be expected to reduce desired capital buffers. The ratio of bank 
loans to total assets  NET () LOANS suggests a riskier profile so the expected sign is 
therefore positive. Annual loan growth ) ( LOAN Δ is a proxy for credit demand (this 
variable is also used by Ayuso et al., 2004) and should be expected to increase assets 
relative to capital and hence lower capital buffers. 
    
3. Estimation Results 
Following previous literature (Ayuso et al., 2004, Estrella, 2004) we use a partial 
adjustment framework with quadratic costs of adjusting capital.
10 Lower adjustment 
costs result in a faster speed of adjustment (δ): 
 
ijt ijt ijt ijt u BUF BUF BUF + − = Δ − ) ( 1
* δ   (1a) 
 Here ijt BUF  and 
*
ijt BUF  are the actual and the optimum capital buffer respec-
tively, of bank i in country  j at time t.  The proportionate adjustment towards the 
desired capital buffer in each period is δ .  ijt u  is the error term that can be decom-
posed as the sum of two components, a random country specific component  i μ , plus 
a pure bank idiosyncratic component  ijt ε . 
   The desired capital stock
*
ijt BUF  however cannot be observed, and is therefore 
approximated by the various cost and revenue variables discussed in the previous 
section.
11 The estimated version (our model 1) including these variables is therefore: 
 
                                                 
9 Banks may vary significantly in their willingness to take risk. This measure therefore can be as-
sumed to uncover information on bank type. Any further idiosyncratic time-invariant component in 
the banks risk profile would be captured by the  i μ component of the residual term of Equation 2. 
10 We do not investigate the possibility of asymmetries in these costs, since it may be easier to reduce 
capital, e.g. by paying dividends or buying back equity, than it is to increase capital. 
11 For a theoretical derivation and explanation of linear-quadratic partial adjustment in models of 
bank capital see Ayuso et al. 2004 or Estrella, 2004.   8
( ) ijt t ijt ijt ijt ijt u CYCLE BUF SMALL IG BUF + + − + + + + = − β δ φ ε γ α 1 ijt ijt 1 B RISK ROE
 
(1b) 
  All of the variables defined in (1b) are defined in levels and so as is common 
with panel data analysis, we proceed to transform (1b) into first differences in order 
to obtain unbiased estimates. Since the model includes the lagged endogenous vari-
able among the regressors and, since some of our other explanatory variables are 
likely to be endogenous, we employ the two-step generalized method of moments 
(GMM) procedure of Arellano and Bond (1991)
12. The instruments chosen include 
the full set of lags of the dependent variable  ) (BUF  together with two to four lags 
of both RISK andROE . In each case, the number of lags was chosen to avoid corre-
lation with the error term  ijt u (which now appears in first differences) while simulta-
neously minimising the number of observations lost.   
  
Estimation results for country groups. 
The results for both model 1 and model 2 are presented in Table 5 for the total EU25 
sample and our four sub-sample country groups. Estimation results are presented 
with both the domestic and the broad (EU25) measures of the cycle (real GDP 
growth). 
  For the EU25 and the EU15, EA and DK-SE-UK sub-samples, we find a nega-
tive significant relationship between the capital buffer and each of the cycle vari-
ables, consistent with our ) ( 1 a H hypothesis. In the Euro Area (EA) sub-samples a 
one-percentage rise in the growth rate of domestic GDP is associated with a 0.13 
percent fall in the capital buffer. The positive 0.12 coefficient on the lagged depend-
ent variable indicates that this cyclical impact increases after one year. A larger im-
pact effect is seen for the DK-SE-UK sample, where the capital buffer decreases on 
average around 0.46 percentage points on a one percentage point rise in the domestic 
cyclical variable, however this is offset by a negative coefficient on the lagged de-
pendent variable. These effects – a positive coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable and a negative coefficient on the growth rate of domestic GDP – carry 
through to the EU15 and EU25 aggregated samples. 
  These findings are broadly in line with previous literature. (Ayuso et al., 2004) 
(Lindqvist, 2004) and (Stoltz and Wedow, 2005) find a similar negative relationship 
between bank buffers and the cycle variables for German, Spanish and Norwegian 
banks respectively. These findings can additionally be compared to those of Bikker 
and Metzemakers (2004) who conduct a cross-country analysis of bank capital buff-
ers for 29 OECD countries. Using the aggregate OECD database they find a nega-
tive relationship between capital buffers and the cycle. Their finding however is only 
marginally statistically significant. They consequently conclude that while the rela-
                                                 
12 The GMM estimator is particularly useful in obtaining unbiased and efficient estimates in dynamic 
models with lagged endogenous variables as regressors.   9
tionship appears to be negative, cyclical effects on buffer movements are fairly lim-
ited. 
  The RAM10 sample returns opposite results. Here we find a significant positive 
relationship between the buffer and the cycle variables, in line with our  ) ( 1 b H hy-
pothesis. Here we see a significant increase in the capital buffer variable of 0.10 and 
0.25 percentage points for a one percentage point rise in the rate of GDP growth. 
  Table 5 also reports results using a broader cyclical measure (GDP growth for 
the EU15, or EU25, as a whole) instead of domestic GDP growth. This makes little 
difference to the results, aside from a slightly smaller coefficient on the lagged de-
pendent variable for the DK-SE-UK sub-sample. 
  Turning to the bank specific variables, the coefficient onROE  is significant with 
the expected negative coefficient in each of the sub-sample estimations, but the coef-
ficient size is fairly small: -0.03 in the EA and RAM10 and slightly larger -0.09 in 
DK-SE-UK. The signs of the BIG  coefficients are negative, consistent with the no-
tion that big banks keep lower levels of capital in the expecation that in the event of 
difficulties, they will be bailed out.  The sign of the SMALL  coefficient is positive, 
suggesting that these banks hold larger capital buffers. These size coefficient are 
however only significant in some sub-samples. 
  RISK  (non performing loans over total lending) is highly significant and posi-
tive for four of the five sub-samples. This suggests that banks with relatively risky 
portfolios generally do hold more capital. For the case of DK-SE-UK, the RISK co-
efficients are negative and significant. 
  Finally, the cost of adjusting capital, captured by the lagged endogenous vari-
able, is positive and significant in almost all cases. This finding is in line with the 
view that the costs of capital adjustment are an important explanation of the holding 
of large capital buffers. The coefficients are largely uniform across sub-samples, 
which would indicate that the costs of adjustment are largely consistent between 
countries, corresponding to a rate of adjustment towards desired capital of around 66 
percent per annum. However we find that the coefficients are negative for the DK, 
SE, UK sub-sample, which is inconsistent with a costly adjustment model of bank 
capital management. 
  Table 6 presents further estimation results for a second model (model specifica-
tion 2), adding several further balance sheet variables to our baseline model (model 
specification 1). The sign of the relationship between GDP growth and bank capital 
buffers is unchanged. In EA and DK-SE-UK sub-samples the magnitude remains 
negative but is smaller (the decline is more marked when using the domestic meas-
ure of the cycle). In the RAM10 the magnitude remains positive and is now larger. 
The additional variables in this second model are themselves cyclically varying, so 
some change in the estimated co-movement is unsurprising. Overall we conclude 
from this second specification that considerable cyclical co-movement and that this 
movement is very different in RAM10 than in the rest of the EU .   10
  The coefficient on the proxy for the cost of holding capital (ROE ) and the speed 
of adjustment (the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable) are broadly un-
changed from those reported for model specification 1. The coefficients for 
theRISK proxies are now larger while the coefficients on the BIG and SMALL vari-
ables are almost the same as in the previous model specification. 
 The  new  PROFIT variable for all sub-samples is positive and highly significant; 
indicating that retained earnings seem to be used to increase the capital cushion. The 
effect is noticeably larger for the EA sample when compared to the other sub-
samples. The expected negative sign for the NET LOANS  variable is found for the 
EU15, EA and RAM10 sub-samples, however the coefficients are broadly insignifi-
cant. The DK-SE-UK sample returns a highly significant positive coefficient. Con-
sidering the  LOAN Δ variable, for all sub-samples, we find the parameter to be 
highly significant, with a negative sign as expected. This finding suggests that a con-
temporaneous increase in loan demand substantially reduces the capital buffer. 
 
Estimation results for sub-groups of types and sizes of banks. 
Table 7 reports further versions of these estimation results, for sub-groups of banks, 
distinguishing commercial, savings and co-operative banks and also large and small 
banks. We report estimates using only for the EA15. Here we wish to determine the 
effect that special bank specific features can have on capital buffer movements. We 
find this particularly useful for our estimations since the RAM10 sub-sample con-
sists only of small commercial banks and RAM10 banks appear to behave so differ-
ently from those in the EA15. Considering commercial and savings banks, we find 
that for savings banks the co-movement with the cycle remains negative, but for co-
operative banks the relationship is very different with a positive relationship evident 
between the cycle and capital buffers. The results for savings banks are more sig-
nificant than for commercial banks, suggesting that the negative relationship re-
ported in Table 5 is largely driven by savings banks.  
  This finding can help explain the relationship between our results and those of 
other researchers. (Stoltz and Wedow, 2005) present evidence for German banks 
showing that the relationship between the buffer and the cycle variable is stronger 
for savings banks than it is for co-operatives. The cross-country study of (Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2004) finds that the cyclical effects appear to be limited. This finding 
is in line with our results since they focus their estimations on commercial banks 
only. (Ayuso et al., 2004) consider only savings and commercial banks in their study 
and find a robustly significant negative relationship. Their study does not however 
analyse bank type effects separately. 
 TheROE variable coefficients are very similar to those reported in Table 5. The 
coefficient is noticeably more significant amongst savings banks than it is for co-
operative or commercial banks. This finding tends to indicate that the cost of hold-
ing excess capital appears to be most significant for co-operative banks when com-
pared to savings and commercial banks.    11
 The  RISK coefficient remains positive and significant for both commercial and 
co-operative banks in all three sub-samples, while it is negative for savings banks. 
The impact of bank size (theBIG and  SMALL variables) is similar to that reported 
in Tables 5 and 6, but only statistically significant for small savings banks. 
  For all three sub-samples, the  1 − t BUF  variable is positive and highly significant 
for commercial banks, while it is much smaller (and significant) for savings banks 
and insignificant for co-operative banks. This suggests that adjustment costs are 
more important for commercial banks. 
  Table 7 also reports a comparison by bank size. Here small banks are as defined 
in Table 3, with total assets less than €37bn in 2004. The dummy variables BIG and 
SMALL are dropped from these estimates. We find a positive and significant rela-
tionship between the capital buffers of small banks and output gap variables, while 
the relationship is negative and significant for large banks. The coefficients on the 
ROE  variable are little changed from those obtained for the initial total sample es-
timations, negative and significant for both small and large banks. The RISK coeffi-
cients remain positive and significant for both small and large banks. The estimated 
cost of adjusting capital (the coefficient on 1 − t BUF ) is significant for both large and 
small banks. The coefficient is somewhat lower for small banks suggesting that ad-
justment costs play a larger role in the case of large banks.  
  To summarise, our estimations by both size and type of bank provide evidence 
that the capital buffers of both small and co-operative banks have a positive relation-
ship with the output gap variables. On the other hand we find negative co-movement 
with the cycle for commercial banks, savings banks, and large banks. These differ-
ential results might be due to different access to capital markets or due to the fact 
both smaller banks as well as cooperative banks are more reliant on retained earn-





We investigated a large variety of alternative specifications as a check on the ro-
bustness of our main findings, including subsets of the explanatory variables re-
ported in Tables 5 and 6. In all cases the relationship between the capital buffer and 
the output gap is very similar to that which we report here.  
  A major concern is endogeneity, leading us to investigate whether the relation-
ships that we report between capital buffers and the business cycle is robust to alter-
native dynamic specifications. We estimate a static version of the model where we 
omit the lagged dependent variable 1 − t BUF . We also experimented with varying lag 
lengths for the explanatory variables, and by dropping the ROE  variable from the 
estimations (since this is itself a cyclically varying variable). Finally we estimated a 
                                                 
13 The analysis underlying these robustness tests is reported in Appendices 2 and 3 of the SSRN 
working paper version of this paper, Jokipii and Milne (2006).   12
'fixed effects' version of the model, in which all the bank specific variables were 
omitted ) , , , ( SMALL BIG ROE RISK but in which we introduce a dummy (fixed ef-
fect) for each bank in the sample. In all these cases the coefficients on the business 
cycle variables remain fairly close to our reported results, indicating that these esti-
mates are reasonably robust to dynamic re-specification. 
  There are potentially individual national effects that could arise from various 
country-specific characteristics relating to the legal, regulatory, structural, or tax and 
accounting framework. A simple way to test, and control for these conditions, is to 
create a country-specific dummy variable  ) ( i D for each country. As it turns out, 
there are no significant fixed country dummy variables in our regressions, indicating 
that all the national effects are already captured by our chosen specifications.  
  We also re-estimated our model 2, including in the explanatory variables both 
the broad cycle and the difference between the broad EU-25 cycle and the domestic 
cycle. In the case of the DK-SE-UK and the RAM10 country grouping, we find that 
both the domestic cycle and the additional impact of the broad cycle are significant 
at the five or ten percent level. In the other sub-samples and the EU25 there is no 
significant additional effect. Very similar results emerged when re-estimating model 
1. This indicates that, while there is collinearity between the broad and domestic cy-
cle, the domestic cycle is the slightly better measure. It does better than the broad 
cycle for DK-SE-UK and the RAM10, while the choice of cycle measure is immate-
rial for the other groupings. 
  Finally we have been concerned with a further econometric problem affecting 
all studies, such as our own, that combine macro-level and micro-data, whether in 
panel or cross-section. This problem, originally highlighted by Moulton (1990), is 
the possibility of a substantial downward bias on standard errors for macro-
economic variables, when there is clustering of unobserved random variables. This 
possibility cannot be ignored in any study such as our own, using micro-level data to 
investigate macro-economic relationships, since any omitted macro-economic vari-
ables will lead to such clustering. The example presented by Moulton (1990) the 
corrected standard errors are three times as large as those obtained without correct. 
Our analysis of this problem suggests that standard errors on our cycle variables 
should be increased by around 20 per cent to allow for clustering. This reduces but 
does not overturn the significance of our results. 
 
 4. Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationship between European bank capital buffers and the 
business cycle. Much of the empirical literature in this field has focussed on examin-
ing the determinants of bank capitalization within a single country. Our research is 
cross-country, comparing behaviour in different sub-sample groups of countries and 
for different groups of banks.   13
  We build an unbalanced panel of 486 banks, using annual balance sheet data be-
tween 1997 and 2004. Controlling for various determinants of capital buffers, we 
analyse the remaining impact of the business cycle. We find a significant negative 
relationship between the capital buffers of banks and the rate of GDP growth, for 
EU25, EU15, EA and DK-SE-UK sub-samples. For the RAM10 banks i.e. those in 
the 10 accession countries that joined the EU in 2004, our results indicate that capi-
tal buffers co-move positively with the output gap.  
  We distinguish further between both type and size of bank. Our findings indicate 
that capital buffers of large banks, and of commercial and savings banks, appear to 
behave in a similar fashion to the sample as a whole, co-moving negatively with the 
output gap i.e. declining in recession.  On the other hand the capital buffers of small 
banks and of co-operative banks co-move positively with the cycle, rising in reces-
sion.  
  Our results complement and extend the findings of previous researchers. Nega-
tive co-movement of capital buffers with the cycle has been reported before for 
banks in individual countries (Ayuso et al., 2004, Lindqvist, 2004, and Stoltz and 
Wedow, 2005). The only previous cross-country study, that of (Bikker and Metze-
makers, 2004) finds rather smaller degree of negative co-movement than us, using a 
longer time period of aggregated OECD bank data. However their data covers only 
commercial banks. Our investigation of different bank types reveals a more pro-
nounced negative co-movement for savings banks than commercial banks, which 
may help to explain the difference in our finding. 
  Our results are essentially descriptive. This raises the question as to why small 
banks and co-operative banks as well as those in accession countries exhibit positive 
co-movement while the other banks that dominate our sample exhibit negative co-
movement. In the case of the accession countries, this may be due to ongoing struc-
tural changes. As indicated in Figure 2, RAM10 capital buffers have been converg-
ing on those in the rest of the EU, and it is possible that negative co-movement may 
be observed once this convergence is complete. 
  For co-operative banks and smaller commercial banks the most likely reason is 
capital market frictions. Small banks find it relatively costly to raise new equity 
capital while co-operative banks are unable to make such issues at all.  These banks 
are thus reliant on retained earnings as a protection against insolvency and this can 
explain a preference for building up capital during economic upturns. With the ex-
ception of the very largest co-operative banks, such banks also find it costly to bor-
row on wholesale debt markets and are thus relatively dependent on retail deposits 
as a source of funding. This makes it difficult for smaller and co-operative banks to 
respond as much to cyclical increases in loan demand as other banks. Because their 
loan assets rise more slowly, this mechanism will also increase their capital buffers 
during cyclical upturns, relative to those of other banks. Further research may eluci-
date these relationships. 
  Negative co-movement suggests additional reasons for concern about the poten-
tial 'pro-cyclical' impact of the introduction of the new Basel II accord on bank capi-  14
tal adequacy. Larger banks, notably the commercial and savings banks, have in our 
sample period reduced capital buffers in the economic downturn. Under the new ac-
cord Pillar 1 capital requirements will be increased in the economic downturn as 
bank exposures are downgraded, whether by external rating agencies or in internal 
rating systems. This suggests that capital management will especially challenging 
under the new accord because it will lead to higher capital requirements precisely at 
the time (the trough of the business cycle) when most of the banks are seeking to 
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    Table 1: Total Capital Buffers by Country (weighted by total assets) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   avg 
AT  0.72 2.09 2.09 1.96 2.89 2.63 3.08 3.10  2.32 
BE  3.43 3.45 4.37 5.75 5.31 5.06 4.66 4.45  4.56 
FI 4.03  2.49  4.01  1.38  1.68  2.53  10.97  11.20    4.79 
FR  2.24 2.31 2.13 1.80 1.78 1.67 1.84 1.49  1.91 
DE  1.96 1.89 2.46 3.00 2.79 2.85 4.41 4.37  2.97 
GR  1.73 1.67 6.21 4.51 2.83 2.24 3.42 4.57  3.40 
IE  3.02 3.54 3.23 3.05 3.05 4.95 6.82 5.54  4.15 
IT  1.49 1.81 1.46 1.61 1.34 2.32 2.42 2.87  1.92 
LU  4.87 4.07 4.26 4.07 3.94 3.75 4.88 2.47  4.04 
NL  2.96 2.84 2.71 2.69 2.80 3.23 3.56 3.50  3.04 
PT  2.66 1.86 2.35 0.98 1.23 1.62 2.04 2.21  1.87 
ES  1.93 2.75 2.39 2.50 3.20 2.82 2.63 2.51  2.59 
 
DK  2.29 2.22 2.62 1.75 2.24 2.43 2.79 2.23  2.32 
SE  2.55 2.73 3.23 2.46 2.70 2.29 2.53 2.68  2.65 
UK  1.70 1.47 1.89 2.37 1.50 0.96 0.92 0.85  1.46 
 
CY  2.13 1.34 3.94 4.63 3.24 1.52 1.48 2.83  2.64 
CZ  2.09 3.79 4.81 6.13 4.03 3.94 4.43 2.74  4.00 
EE 3.23  8.57  10.55  7.53  6.84  6.55  5.18  4.01    6.56 
HU  4.51 4.73 7.32 6.88 3.27 4.68 2.27 1.96  4.45 
LAT  8.10 1.60 4.78 3.00 2.74 2.42 2.33 4.14  3.64 
LIT 2.23  15.40  3.12  3.79  4.49  4.81  1.97  2.28    4.76 
MAL  6.57 8.46 8.06 8.27 6.65 7.19 7.71 3.01  6.99 
PL  2.32 2.18 4.84 5.36 6.33 5.67 5.76 7.67  5.02 
SLK           5.36  10.14  12.05    9.18 
SLV  8.06 6.10 5.49 6.71 6.03 8.09 6.29 6.04  6.60 
 
EU25  3.20 3.72 4.10 3.84 3.45 3.66 4.18 4.03  3.77 
EU15  2.51 2.48 3.03 2.66 2.62 2.76 3.80 3.60  2.93 
EA  2.59 2.56 3.14 2.77 2.74 2.97 4.23 4.02  3.13 
DK-SE-UK 2.18 2.14 2.58 2.19 2.15 1.90 2.08 1.92  2.14 
RAM10  4.36 5.80 5.88 5.81 4.85 5.02 4.75 4.67  5.14 
                              Note: AT= Austria, BE= Belgium, DE= Germany, ES= Spain, FI= Finland, FR= France, GR= Greece,  IE= Ireland,  
                                        IT= Italy, LU= Luxembourg, NL= Netherlands, PT= Portugal, DK= Denmark,  SE= Sweden, UK= United 
                                       Kingdom,CY= Cyprus, CZ= Czech Republic, EE= Estonia, HU= Hungary,LAT=Latvia, LIT=Lithuania,  
                                       MAL= Malta, PL= Poland, SK= Slovakia, SL=Slovenia. 
                                      * denotes figures equal to the un-weighted average of composite countries. 
        Capital buffer is defined as the institutions total risk weighted capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) capital less the required 
                 minimum ( 8% or the higher value in Table 2). Within each country average bank capital buffers weighted by bank 
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                       Table 2: National Total (Tier 1 + Tier 2) Capital Requirements 




UK 9%  1979 
CY 8  %  1997 
 10  %  2001 
EE 10  %  1997 
LAT 10  %  1997 
 8  %  2004 
LIT 10  %  1997 
 8  %  2005 
SL 8  %  2002 
 Note:The FSA sets additional unpublished 'trigger' and 'higher target' ratio for UK banks resulting in higher levels of capital required 
by the regulators.To allow for this  apply a 9% requirement to UK banks active in the sample and calculate the buffer as capital above  
this level. RAM countries have followed UK practice, setting higher capital requirements than 8%.. Further discussion of individual 
country capital requirements is reported in Appendix 1 of Jokipii and Milne (2006) 
 
Table 3: Distribution of the Sample 







(total assets> €37 
billion in 2004) 
small banks 
(total assets< €37 
billion in 2004) 
total 
 
EU25  311 77  80 85  383  468 
EU15  271 77  79 79  348  427 
EA  214 76  74 59  305  364 
DK-SE-UK  57 1  5 20  43  63 
RAM10  40 0  1 6  35  41 
 
Table 4: Description of Variables Adopted 
Variable Description 
BUF   total capital-national regulatory minimum (%) 
ROE   return on equity (%) 
RISK   ratio of non-performing loans to total loans  (%) 
BIG   dummy variable : value 1 for banks in highest size decile 
of country sub-sample at time t 
SMALL   dummy variable : value 1 for banks in lowest thirty per-
centile of sub-sample at time t 
PROFIT   post-tax profit over total assets 
LOAN Δ   annual loan growth  (%) 
NET LOANS   loans over total assets 
CYCLE   domestic and sub-sample GDP growth 
 
   19
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